Abstract. This paper considers unconditionally secure protocols for reliable broadcast among a set of n players, where up to t of the players can be corrupted by a (Byzantine) adversary but the remaining h = n −t players remain honest. In the standard model with a complete, synchronous network of bilateral authenticated communication channels among the players, broadcast is achievable if and only if 2n/ h < 3.
Introduction
A fundamental problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing is to achieve consistency of the involved parties' views, even if some of the parties (also called players) deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner. A core primitive for achieving global consistency is broadcast, i.e., a mechanism or protocol allowing one player, the sender, to send a value consistently to all other players such that, even in case of malicious behavior by the sender and/or some of the other players, all honest players receive the same value.
The standard model considered in fault-tolerant distributed computing is that every pair of players can communicate over a bilateral authenticated channel. In this model, authenticated channels are simply assumed to exist. In practice, they can be implemented using cryptographic techniques. Such techniques assume an initial set-up phase such as the establishment of a public-key infrastructure, or sharing pairwise secret keys.
The problem of implementing broadcast in the standard model [32] is a classical problem in distributed computing. The seminal result of Lamport et al. [32] is that broadcast can be implemented if and only if less than a third of all the players misbehave.
Motivation
In this paper we propose to investigate a new research direction by assuming, as part of the model, more powerful primitives than authenticated channels, i.e., primitives that guarantee some degree of consistency among the players. The additional primitive we consider is probably the simplest one that can serve as an extension of the standard model, namely channels that guarantee consistency among b participants when one of them sends a value to the others.
Our motivation for considering such enhanced models is twofold. First, the generic reduction of complex tasks to simple ones is a useful tool for proving whether or not a task is achievable under given conditions, only requiring a construction for the simple task in order to prove the achievability of the complex one, and only requiring to show the impossibility of the complex task in order to prove the simple one to be impossible.
Second, for unconditional multi-party computation 1 among n players, the achievability of broadcast is a limiting factor. As 2n/ h < 3 is the lower bound for multi-party computation when broadcast is not available, broadcast allows for n/ h < 2. When additionally assuming oblivious transfer, non-robust multi-party computation is still achievable in the presence of any number of corrupted players. As broadcast is typically the only assumed primitive that involves all n players (in contrast to other commonly assumed primitives such as pairwise channels or oblivious transfer), it is a natural question to ask whether global broadcast is necessary for multi-party computation beyond 2n/ h < 3 or, alternatively, what resilience can be achieved for multi-party computation when only assuming primitives of constant size.
Models and Definitions
Byzantine agreement refers to the general problem of having a set P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } of n players agree on a value v from some finite domain D where some of the players may be corrupted. There are two main variations of Byzantine agreement, broadcast and consensus. The goal of broadcast (or the Byzantine generals problem) is to have some designated player p s , called the sender, consistently send an input value (or message) x s to all other players. The goal of consensus, where every player p i starts with an input value x i of his own, is to make all honest (non-corrupted) players decide on a common output value such that, if all honest players hold the same input value v, this common output value is v.
Communication
The players in P are connected via a complete, synchronous network of pairwise authenticated channels. A pairwise authenticated channel between two players p i and p j is a bilateral communication channel that guarantees that only the two respective players can send messages on the channel, i.e., excluding any third party from accessing it in any other way than possibly reading the communication between the two players. In particular, we assume that communication via an authenticated channel cannot be blocked by a third party. Synchronicity means that all players share common, synchronized clock cycles. In such a clock cycle, each player first receives a finite (possibly empty) set of messages from the other players, followed by a finite number (possibly zero) of local computation steps, and finally sends a finite (possibly empty) set of messages to the other players. Messages being sent during a clock cycle are guaranteed to have arrived at the beginning of the next cycle.
We refer to the communication model described so far in this section as the classical model, denoted by M 2 . In contrast, we introduce the partial-broadcast model, M b , below.
Definition 1 (M b
. Model M b extends the classical model by perfectly reliable synchronous broadcast channels among each b-tuple of players, i.e., authenticated broadcast channels (denoted BC b ) from p i 1 to players p i 2 , . . . , p i b , for any selection of b distinct players from P. We assume all bilateral and BC b -channels to be composable in parallel (or at least sequentially).
Composability
It has long been a common technique to construct complex protocols by combining subprotocols that achieve simpler tasks. When giving a security proof of such a construction, the fact that the subprotocols compose correctly is usually not made explicit because it is typically trivial in the context of the protocol itself. On the other hand, composability can become non-trivial when the whole context of the execution of the (sub-)protocols is not known in advance [6] , [33] . We note that, in our modular construction, our subprotocols trivially compose with each other, and so do the final protocols.
Adversary and Corruption
The resilience of a protocol is characterized by the number t of players that may deviate from the protocol. We refer to such a player as being corrupted whereas a noncorrupted player is called honest. Alternatively, h = n − t denotes the minimal number of players that are assumed to be honest. It helps to imagine a central adversary who can corrupt up to t players and make them cheat in an arbitrary, coordinated manner. We consider an adaptive adversary who can gradually corrupt arbitrary new players during the protocol, but at most t in total. Note, however, that our impossibility results are proven even with respect to the strictly weaker definition of a non-adaptive (or static) adversary that is assumed to preselect up to t of the players at the beginning of the protocol and not corrupt any further players during any later stage of the protocol.
Security
We demand our protocols to be unconditionally secure, i.e., we require that even a computationally unbounded adversary cannot make the protocol fail except for some negligible error probability. Our final broadcast protocol will even be perfectly secure (zero error probability). On the other hand, our impossibility result is given even with respect to an adversary that is bounded to polynomial-time computation.
Setup Assumptions
We assume that all players know the player set, the protocol, and the whole network topology, i.e., they know which players participate in the protocol and how they are connected by communication channels. Additionally, we assume that all players agree on a common point in time when the protocol is to be started.
The achievable resilience of Byzantine agreement depends on whether or not one assumes that a public-key infrastructure (PKI) is consistently set up among the players. Such a PKI would allow all messages to be signed and enable broadcast with arbitrary resilience and consensus for n/ h < 2. In this paper we consider the case where no such PKI is set up among the players.
Complexities
We characterize the efficiency of the protocols in terms of the computational complexity, i.e., the local computational worst-case complexity of the honest players, the bit complexity, i.e., the total number of bits communicated by all honest players during the protocol in the worst case, and the round complexity, i.e., the maximal number of communication rounds for any honest player in the worst case. Our round complexity analyses are given under the assumption that the underlying channels are composable in parallel without any side-effects on each other.
Broadcast, Consensus, and Proxcast
Definition 2 (Broadcast). A protocol for the player set P, where player p s ∈ P (the sender) holds an input value x s ∈ D and every player p i ∈ P computes an output value y i ∈ D, achieves broadcast (or is a broadcast protocol) if it satisfies the following conditions:
Consistency (or agreement): All honest players decide on the same output value, i.e., y i = y j for all honest players p i and p j . Validity: If the sender p s is honest, then every honest player p i decides on the sender's input value, i.e., y i = x s . Note that, in contrast to broadcast, the consensus definition only makes sense if less than half of the players are corrupted. In this case, broadcast can easily be achieved using consensus and vice versa. Thus, we focus on broadcast in what follows, and generalize our results to consensus only at the very end. Furthermore, we mainly focus on binary broadcast (domain D = {0, 1}) since broadcast for any finite domain D can be efficiently solved by log 2 |D| invocations of its binary variant. A more efficient way to achieve this was given in [40] by Turpin and Coan. We now introduce the primitive proxcast which serves as a fundamental building block for our protocol constructions. Proxcast was first defined in [38] . P k n is a broadcast-like primitive that achieves the validity property of broadcast. Additionally, it is guaranteed that the players' outputs are proximate in the sense that they do not deviate too strongly from each other. P k n is best introduced pictorially and by means of a binary input domain. See Fig. 1 .
Definition 3 (Consensus
The sender sends a bit x ∈ {0, 1}. Each player p i receives an output ∈ {0, . . . , k −1}. If the sender is honest then each honest player gets output x · (k − 1). If the sender is corrupted then it is still guaranteed that there is a value m such that all honest players get an output ∈ {m, m + 1}. Alternatively, the output can be represented as a pair (y, g) with output bit y and grade value g = 0, . . . , (k − 1)/2 . If the sender is honest then each honest player gets bit y = x and maximal grade g = (k − 1)/2 . If the sender is corrupted then the honest players still receive adjacent grades g ∈ {z, z + 1}. If any honest player gets a high enough grade g then it is guaranteed that all honest players hold the same output bit y-as can be verified, this is the case for grades g > k mod 2. 2 According to requirements we use the two different representations interchangeably.
Definition 4 (Proxcast). Let k > 0 be an integer. A protocol among player set P where player p s ∈ P (the sender) holds an input value x s ∈ D and every player p i ∈ P finally decides on an output value y i ∈ D and a grade g i ∈ {0, . . . , (k − 1)/2 } achieves k-proxcast (P Alternatively, if D = {0, 1}, we say that a player with values y i ∈ {0, 1} and
3 The validity and consistency conditions then transform into
Validity : If the sender is honest with input x s then every honest player p i computes
Well known special cases of proxcast are multi-send (k = 2), crusader agreement [12] (k = 3), and graded broadcast [17] (k = 5). We denote an invocation of P Let a protocol for binary P k n be given, i.e., x ∈ {0, 1} and g ∈ {0, . . . , (b − 1)/2 }. Multi-valued P k n with a given domain D, x ∈ D, can be achieved by running an instance of binary P k n with respect to every single bit in the binary representation of x. The recipients then decide on the value y being composed of all the bits received during these invocations plus on the minimal grade ever received during the binary invocations.
Since proxcast (broadcast) for any finite input domain efficiently reduces to binary proxcast (broadcast, respectively) we restrict ourself to the binary case in what follows.
Protocol Notation
Protocols are understood to be specified with respect to a player set S ⊆ P = {p 1 , . . . , p n }. Each player p i ∈ S runs the same program, using as the input (if there is one) his own input, say x i . The local variable names indicate the index i of the player p i performing the instruction. For instance,
refers to a protocol for broadcast among the player set S where player p 1 holds input x 1 and the other players hold no input. Some of the instructions are indicated as being only for a specific player, e.g., the sender:
means that player p 1 sends the value stored in (his local) variable v 1 to all players in S and that each player p i (including p 1 ) assigns the received value to his local variable w i . At the end of a protocol, each player outputs a value, usually stored in the local variable y i , written return y i .
The domain of the values is usually specified implicitly. For simplicity, it is not explicitly stated how to handle received values (from a corrupted player) outside the domain. Such a value can be assumed to be replaced by some default value, either an arbitrary value in the domain or a special extra symbol ⊥.
Previous Work
The Byzantine agreement problem was introduced by Lamport et al. [32] . For the standard model M 2 they presented a broadcast protocol among n players that is secure for 2n/ h < 3. As proven in [32] , [31] , and [18] , this bound is tight, i.e., no protocol can tolerate 2n/ h ≥ 3, not even if the adversary is computationally bounded. The first efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) broadcast protocol was given in [15] by Dolev and Strong, followed by a variety of alternative protocols with different interesting properties [14] , [39] , [1] , [17] , [5] , [8] , [28] .
The extension of the standard communication model by partial broadcast was already considered in [27] , [26] , and [41] in the context of secure point-to-point communication over an incomplete network, a problem initially studied by Dolev et al. [13] for the standard communication model. In [27] Franklin and Yung show how to achieve private point-to-point communication in the presence of a passive adversary, given partial broadcast but not necessarily pairwise communication channels among the players. Secure point-to-point communication over partial-broadcast networks in the presence of an active adversary was considered by Franklin and Wright [26] and Wang and Desmedt [41] . The special case of b = 3 was introduced and fully treated in [25] . In [9] 2n/ h < b + 1 was shown to be a lower bound for the case of general b. There, a protocol matching this bound for integers n/ h was given. That protocol additionally assures agreement whenever the sender is honest regardless of the number of corrupted recipients; requiring this extra property, the protocol is optimal even for fractional n/ h. Protocols matching the lower bound 2n/ h < b+1 for fractional n/ h were independently developed in [19] and [10] . Protocols that are polynomial in the size of the network were given in [20] .
Result and Sources

Outline
We first give our proof of the lower bound in Section 2. The proof is obtained by using ideas of Fischer et al. who in [18] introduced a standard technique in order to prove the impossibility of Byzantine agreement in standard scenarios. We also use a simulation argument from [32] for this purpose.
We then describe two different protocols with respect to the optimal bound 2n/ h < b + 1. Since both protocols are built on b-proxcast, P b n (as given in Definition 4), we first show how to implement that primitive efficiently in Section 3.
In Section 4 we present our first protocol which extends the recursive construction in [32] known under the name "information gathering (IG)" [1] . This protocol is less complicated than the second one but generally superpolynomial in the size n b of the network. IG among n players is implicitly based on two-threshold broadcast among less than n players, a generalization of broadcast that achieves validity and consistency with respect to different thresholds [24] .
In Section 5 we present our second construction. The resulting protocol's complexities are polynomial in the size n b of the network. The protocol is obtained along the lines of the protocols in [16] and [34] where a PKI is assumed to be set up among the players with respect to a (pseudo-)signature scheme. We demonstrate that k-proxcast (with sufficiently large k) is powerful enough to replace a PKI with respective signatures in the protocols of [16] and [34] , thus yielding a protocol for our model without the need for a PKI or signatures. We also show how to transform P b n into P k n efficiently for the required k.
Final remarks and the extension of the results to consensus are given in Section 6.
Lower Bound
We prove that, in Model M b , secure global broadcast among n > b players is impossible if 2n/ h ≥ b + 1. We first prove the inexistence of a protocol for n = b + 1 and h = 2 by generalizing the proof idea in [18] for the impossibility of broadcast among n players in the standard model with respect to 2n/ h < 3. Actually, this yields a stronger result, namely that such a protocol cannot exist even for a weaker adversary whose choice of which players he must leave uncorrupted is restricted to two consecutive players. The final impossibility result for general n will then be derived from this special case along the lines of a similar generalization in [32] .
Impossibility for n = b + 1 and h = 2
Our aim is to show that, for each possible protocol among b + 1 players, there is an admissible adversary that can make the protocol fail with some non-negligible probability by corrupting at most b − 1 of the players. For this, we assume any potential broadcast protocol to be given and consider it in two different contexts, distributed systems and (see Fig. 2 for the special case b = 3). System is the original setting among the b + 1 players where the adversary corrupts b − 1 of them. By assumption, the protocol achieves broadcast in this system.
In system no adversary is present, i.e., all players follow the protocol correctly. However, the players are arranged in a different way. In particular, is a distributed system built of 2b + 2 players-the b + 1 original ones together with one identical copy of each of them. Still, protocol can be run in this extended system-meaning that all 2b + 2 players run their respective local codes and communicate with the players they are connected to.
We show that, for certain pairs of players, their joint views in protocol are indistinguishable with respect to the different systems and . That is, such a pair of players cannot tell whether they are involved in system or . This implies that system (i.e., the rearrangement of the players) simulates an admissible adversary in the original system with respect to several pairs of players simultaneously.
Since we assume the protocol to be secure in the presence of h = 2 honest players, the validity and consistency conditions of broadcast must thus be satisfied for each one of these pairs even in system . However, we will be able to conclude that it is impossible to achieve these conditions simultaneously with respect to all involved pairs-hence showing that the assumed protocol cannot be secure in the original system .
Technical details. Let P = {p 0 , . . . , p b } be the n = b + 1 players with sender p 0 and let be a protocol among the players in P. Protocol specifies a local program ψ i for each player p i . Let the integer i ∈ {0, . . . , b} be called the type of player p i , uniquely defining the program ψ i it is supposed to run. Our communication model suggests that each player p i has ports with respect to each communication channel it shares with other players. Let p i 's bilateral port of type j denote the port it uses for its bilateral communication with player p j . When necessary, we distinguish p i 's bilateral read port of type j (where it reads the messages received from player p j ) from its bilateral write port of type j (where it writes the messages to be sent to player p j ). Finally, let p i 's BC b port of type j denote the port it uses for its communication via the BC b channel it shares with the players in P\{ p j }. Fig. 2 sketches how the players are connected with each other in the original setting for the special case of b = 3 (where the bilateral channels are represented by arrows and the BC b channels are represented by shaded triangles). We refer to this distributed system as the original system .
Reconnection of Players. The left part of
We now describe the simulation system which is sketched in the right part of the figure for the special case b = 3. For each player p i ∈ P, let p i+n be an identical copy of p i . System consists of the 2n = 2(b +1) players P = {p 0 , . . . , p 2b+1 }, all connected 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000 together as described further below. Let Type(i) = i mod n denote the type of player p i ∈ P . There are hence two players of each of the b + 1 types and, in particular, two senders p 0 and p n who take binary input x 0 and x n , respectively. In order to define the system exactly we need to specify, for each player p i (i ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1}), with which other players its communication channels are connected. The 2n players p 0 , . . . , p 2n−1 are arranged in a circular way, with the channels of each player arranged in a cyclically identical manner. It thus suffices to describe the channels of player p 0 .
Each bilateral write port of p 0 of type k = 1, . . . , b − 1 is connected to the bilateral read port of type 0 of the specific player p k as originally. Player p 0 's bilateral write port of type b is connected to the bilateral read port of type 0 of the specific player p 2n−1 . 5 Since any two adjacent players p i and p (i+1) mod 2n are consistently interconnected in (see the previous paragraph), this adversary strategy now guarantees that that the joint view of the players p i and p (i+1) mod 2n is identical to the joint view of the players p i mod n and p (i+1) mod n in the original system . Proof. We assume that, without loss of generality, the sender's program ψ 0 outputs its own input value. Now, consider the system being started with input x 0 = 0 for p 0 and input x n = 1 for p n . Let q i , for i = 0, . . . , b, be the probability (in system ) that players p i and p i+1 output different values, i.e., y i = y i+1 . Since y 0 = 0 and y n = 1, we have
Since for any pair of adjacent players in system , their view is identical to their respective players' view in the original system , the consistency condition of broadcast demands that y i = y i+1 holds for every i = 1, . . . , b also in system -in contradiction to (1) . In particular, in the original system , the following adversary strategy makes the protocol fail with a probability of at least 1/n. The adversary selects one of the n pairs { p i , p (i+1) mod n } ⊂ P (i = 0, . . . , b) uniformly at random and corrupts the remaining players (P\{ p i , p (i+1) mod n }) by simulating the players in { p 0 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+2 , . . . , p 2n−1 } of system towards the players p i and p (i+1) mod n . Thus, the probability that the honest players p i and p (i+1) mod n disagree on their outputs is
and the lemma follows.
Impossibility for General
We now give the impossibility proof for general n. We show that any protocol for general n > b and 2n/ h ≥ b + 1 could be used in order to achieve broadcast among b + 1 players where the adversary can corrupt at least b − 1 consecutive players-which is impossible by Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Let |P| = n and 2n/ h ≥ b + 1. It is possible to partition P into b + 1 sets
Proof. Let k = n mod(b+1) and n = λ(b+1)+k. The set P is partitioned into b+1 sets P i of n/(b + 1) or n/(b + 1) elements in any possible way except for the following constraint: if k ≥ (b+1)/2 then it is additionally assured that
The lemma follows by distinction of the following two cases.
In particular, the adversary can make the protocol fail with probability at least 1/(b + 1).
Proof. Assume any broadcast protocol for n > b players Q = {q 0 , . . . , q n−1 } with sender q 0 , secure for 2n/ h ≥ b + 1. With the help of protocol , the b + 1 players P = {p 0 , . . . , p b } can achieve broadcast secure for any honest pair { p i , p (i+1) mod(b+1) } as follows. The set Q is partitioned into b + 1 sets Q 0 , . . . , Q b such that q 0 ∈ Q 0 , and
which is possible by Lemma 3. The players in P can now achieve broadcast by having each player p i simulate all players q j ∈ Q i in an instance of protocol . There, the players in Q i ∪ Q (i+1) mod(b+1) for some i = 0, . . . , b are honest since at least one pair { p i , p (i+1) mod(b+1) } of the simulating players is. Since |Q i ∪ Q (i+1) mod(b+1) | ≥ h by construction, protocol achieves broadcast among the simulating players in P, as secure as with respect to the player set Q. Thus, by Lemma 2, protocol must have an error probability of at least 1/(b + 1).
Note that this impossibility result holds with respect to the stronger model where the players are connected by secure bilateral channels and where the adversary is static and limited to probabilistic polynomial computation.
Efficient b-Proxcast
Let := (b − 1)/2 be the maximal possible grade in P 
In step 4 of the protocol, let "min" denote any minimal set that satisfies the given condition and let ":⊆" denote the assignment of any set satisfying the respective condition.
Protocol 1. P
Proof. If b = n then the lemma trivially holds. Thus we assume that b < n. Although this process does not guarantee that the honest players p i compute a minimal set Z i it still guarantees that they compute an extremal set (|Z i | = 0 if x s = 0, and
when the sender is honest, and, that there is a player p j such that each honest player p k 's set satisfies |Z k | ∈ {|Z j |, |Z j | + 1}.
The following protocol is to replace step 4 in Protocol 1. Note that step 5 below is necessary in order to guarantee that, in round z, p i indeed composes a set Z i of exact cardinality z + 1 (in the textual description above this is not necessarily the case since the set obtained might contain p i himself). ). The computational complexity is dominated by the test in step 4 of Protocol 2 which is evidently polynomial in n b .
The Information-Gathering Protocol
We now present our information-gathering (IG) protocol for global broadcast in model of the network. IG among n players is implicitly based on subprotocols for two-threshold broadcast [24] .
Definition 5 (Two-Threshold Broadcast). A protocol among P where player p s ∈ P (called the sender) holds an input value x s ∈ D and every player p i ∈ P finally decides on an output value y i ∈ D, and achieves two-threshold broadcast (TTBC, for short) with respect to thresholds t v and t c if it satisfies the following conditions:
Validity: If the sender p s and at most t v players overall are corrupted then all honest players p i decide on the sender's input value, y i = x s . Consistency: If at most t c players are corrupted then all honest players decide on the same output value.
TTBC among a player set S ⊆ P (n = |S|) with sender p s and thresholds t v and t c (t v ≥ t c ) recursively works as follows. First, the sender p s distributes his input value x s to all players in S via an instance of P b n . Then each player p i ∈ S\{ p s } recursively redistributes the received value with an instance of TTBC among the n = n−1 remaining players (S := S\{ p s }) with respect to threshold t c = t c − 1. Now, every player holds the same n = n − 1 votes (one per remaining player) on what level the respective player received in the invocation of P b n . The only difference between two players' views can now be that their initial levels received during P b n differ by one (consistency of P b n ). The decision rule finally manages to reunite respective adjacent views while still guaranteeing validity with respect to an honest sender. Note that the recursion works on reduced n = n − 1 and t c = t c − 1 but leaves t v unchanged.
In the following protocol, let h v := n − t v and h c := n − t c , and for any predicate Q, let 0 k=1 Q := true. Note that the protocol is binary. Thus the recursion in step 3 does not only branch in order of n (n − 1 subcalls) but also in order log b since j ∈ {0, . . . , b − 1} must be processed bitwise. p s , x s , t v , t c ) 1 
Protocol 3. TTBC(S,
. if n = b then y i := BC b (S, p s , x s ) else (y i , g i , i ) := P b n (P, p s , x s ) fi; 2. if i = s then y i := x s ; return y i fi if t c = 0 ∨ b = n then return y i fi; 3. ∀ p j ∈ S\{ p s }: j i := TTBC(S\{ p s }, p j , j , t v , t c − 1) fi; 4. ∀ ∈ [0, b − 1] : L i [ ] := |{p j ∈ S\{ p s }| j i = }|; 5. if i k=1 (L i [k − 1] + L i [k] ≥ h c ) ∧ (L i [0] ≥ h v − 1) then 6.y i = 0 = x s . If x s = 1 then i = b − 1 and L i [b − 1] ≥ h v − 1. Thus, p i computing y i = 0 would imply that, additionally, L i [0] ≥ h v − 1 and L i [k] + L i [k + 1] ≥ h c for k = 0, . . . , b − 2,
and thus that at least (2(h
(Consistency) Assume that at most t c players are corrupted. If t c = 0 or b = n then consistency is trivially satisfied according to step 2. If the sender p s is honest then consistency follows from validity (proven above) since t v ≥ t c .
Thus, assume that t c > 0, n > b, the sender p s is corrupted, and that, by induction, the protocol achieves TTBC with respect to n = n − 1, t v = t v , and t c = t c − 1.
Since the sender is corrupted, only t c = t c − 1 corrupted players remain in S\{ p s }, and are involved in step 3. Hence, by induction, every invocation of the protocol in step 3 achieves consistency. Furthermore, since t v ≥ t c , also validity is achieved, i.e., all invocations of the protocol in step 3 achieve broadcast. This implies that two honest players p i and p j compute exactly the same sets
Let p i be an honest player with minimal -value, i.e., such that for all other honest players p j : i ≤ j . By the consistency property of P b n , it holds that j ∈ { i , i + 1}.
We now show that all honest players p j compute y j = y i . If j = i then both players have exactly the same view and hence decide in the same way, y j = y i . Thus, assume that j = i + 1.
•
, and by the consistency property of P 
Proof. Protocol 3 is invoked with parameters
t v = t c = n − h. Since 2n/ h < b + 1, it holds that 2t v + (b − 1)t c = (b + 1)(n − h) = (b − 1)n + (2n − (b + 1)h) < (b − 1)n
The Protocol Along the Lines of Dolev-Strong
For any number t of corrupted players, the broadcast protocol of Dolev and Strong [16] can be based on any authentication scheme with transferability k ≥ t +1, e.g., any digital signature scheme or the unconditional pseudo-signature scheme in [35] . The protocol then is as secure as the component authentication scheme.
In this section we first show that even the weaker assumption of P 2(t+1) n (or P 2(n−h+1) n , respectively) is sufficient for broadcast, by slightly adapting the Dolev-Strong protocol to this different primitive. We then give an efficient construction for P 2(n−h+1) n under the assumption that 2n/ h < b + 1, which can then be plugged into that broadcast protocol.
The stepwise construction of the final broadcast protocol is depicted in Fig. 3 . First, BC b is transformed into P b n with arbitrary resilience. How to achieve this was already shown in Section 3. Then P b n is iteratively transformed into P 2(n−h+1) n which is possible if 2n/ h < b + 1. This step is demonstrated in Section 5.2. Finally, P 2(n−h+1) n can be plugged into our modified Dolev-Strong protocol which we present in Section 5.1. 
Implies Broadcast
We now show that (efficient) proxcast with parameter k = 2(n −h +1) implies (efficient) broadcast secure if 2n/ h < b + 1. For this, the Dolev-Strong protocol (with a small modification in [34] ) is executed using proxcast instead of signatures. Every player p i ∈ P maintains a set A i of accepted values that, at the end, is either ∅, {0}, {1}, or {0, 1}. Furthermore, every player p i maintains two sets S i [0] and S i [1] that consist of elements in {1, . . . , n}. For ease of exposition, we parameterize the following protocol by the number of corrupted players t = n − h whereby k = 2(n − h + 1) turns into k = 2t + 2.
The whole protocol proceeds for t + 1 phases. In a first phase, p s initiates an instance of P (Complexities) The round complexity of Protocol 5 is R ≤ (t + 1)R 0 , its bit complexity is B = O(nt B 0 ), 6 and its computational complexity is evidently polynomial in nC 0 .
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemma 6.
Transformation from
We now present an efficient transformation from P b n to P 2(n−h+1) n for the case that 2n/ h < b + 1. The transformation proceeds in a stepwise manner from P k n to P k+1 n . The basic step involves one invocation of P k n and n invocations of P b n . Since the basic step involves P k n only once, the final reduction will be efficient.
Transformation Idea
In a first round, an instance of P k n is executed with the same sender as designated for the broadcast. In a second round, every player (including the original sender, for simplicity) distributes his result using an instance of P For simplicity, we first describe the initial transformation from P b n to P b+1 n , i.e., k = b. The following transformation steps then proceed in a very similar way.
Decision Rule
Consider the case k = b and let = (b − 1)/2 be the maximal possible grade in the second instances of proxcast. In order to guarantee validity, a player p i with level
However, if the sender is corrupted and an honest player p i still has this respective view then, in order to guarantee consistency, an honest player p j with level j = b − 2 must change his level to L j ∈ {b − 1, b}. This, in turn, implies that an honest player p m with level m = b − 3 must upgrade his level to L m ∈ {b − 2, b − 1} whenever an honest player p j with this respective view exists, etc.
We now describe how a player p i computes his final level L i based on his local view, i.e., level i and the n received pairs (
. In order to do so, we define the distance between two pairs of the form (x, g) (g ∈ {0, . . . , }). Informally, the distance between two pairs simply characterizes how far they are apart in the "scale" of proxcast. Reconsider Fig. 1 .
Definition 6. The distance between two levels
In these new terms, validity demands the following rule:
Given any honest player p i following the above rule, an honest player p k with level k = b − 2 (which is possible in case the sender is corrupted) must also upgrade his level to
Thus, assume that an honest player p i follows the above rule. By the consistency property of proxcast (second round), the h pairs ( 
The rule now progresses further to
In order to guarantee consistency, this rule must now progress all the way to level i = 1. Note that a player p i with level i < b − 1 simply inherits the upgrade rule for i + 1 (weakened by a distance of 1) plus he gets one additional rule. Finally, we apply the following rule for i = 0:
e., a player p i with level i = 0 upgrades whenever there is not enough "support" for 0. In all other cases, a player p i keeps his level,
This approach obviously guarantees validity and consistency as long as no honest player p i holds i = 0. In order to prove consistency for i = 0, we finally show that any honest player p j upgrading from j = 1 to L j = 2 implies that |{ j | ( 
Note that two consecutive sets S k and S k+1 are not necessarily disjoint whereas, in favor of our final analysis, we demand that two non-consecutive sets S k and S m (m / ∈ {k, k ± 1}) are disjoint. Such sets S k can be efficiently constructed in a way that guarantees the precondition of the upgrade rule exactly if it can be satisfied: this is achieved by assigning the sets S k by increasing index k. This guarantees that "close" pairs are not wasted for too "distant" sets S k that tolerate more relaxed conditions.
The upgrade rule is also depicted in Fig. 4 for the case where i = 1 and where p i must upgrade to L i = 2 (the sets T 0 and T 1 will be required later for a counting argument). Each possible output value ∈ {0, . . . , b − 1} of the initial instance of P Proof. The theorem now follows from Theorems 3, 7, 5, and 2.
Remarks
Pairwise Channels
Initially, Model M b was defined as an extension of Model M 2 (Definition 1), i.e., in addition to partial-broadcast channels, we required pairwise channels. However, since our protocols do not involve any secrecy, every invocation of a pairwise channel can be simulated by the invocation of a partial-broadcast channel. Thus the assumption of pairwise communication channels is not required.
Erroneous Partial Broadcast
In the previous analyses of our protocols, we assumed the BC b -channels to be perfectly reliable, i.e., to involve no error probability. The results naturally generalize to the case when the underlying BC b -channels involve some error probability. In order to achieve an overall failure probability negligible in a security parameter k, a security parameter κ = k + O(log n b ) for the BC b -channels is sufficient-which is κ = k + O(log n) for the special case of b = O(1) or n − b = O(1).
Consensus
The given results immediately extend to the consensus variant of Byzantine agreement. Proof. Note that consensus implies broadcast for n/ h < 2 and that consensus is impossible when n/ h ≥ 2. Thus impossibility beyond the stated bound follows.
Consensus for n/ h < 2 can be efficiently simulated by broadcast among the same players. In the case of b = 2, the resulting protocol is directly polynomial in n. In order to be polynomial in n for the case of b > 2, we have to make sure that only polynomially many BC b -channels are involved. However, since BC 3 -channels are sufficient to achieve n/ h < 2, we can simply use the construction for b = 3 thereby simulating each BC 3 -channel by a BC b -channel involving the same three players.
Multi-Party Computation
Previous work. Byzantine agreement is a special case of the more general problem of multi-party computation (MPC), initially defined by Yao [42] , where the players want to evaluate distributedly some agreed function(s) on their inputs in a way preserving privacy of their inputs and correctness of the computed result.
Goldreich et al. [29] gave the first complete solution to the problem for Model M 2 : an efficient protocol that is computationally secure for n/ h < 2-which is optimal (with respect to computational security).
Ben-Or et al. [4] and Chaum et al. [7] gave the first optimal solutions with respect to unconditional security for Model M 2 : efficient protocols unconditionally secure for 2n/ h < 3. Also this bound is tight.
For Model M n (i.e., when additionally given broadcast channels), Beaver [2] and Rabin and Ben-Or [37] proposed efficient protocols that are unconditionally secure if n/ h < 2. Also this bound is tight. A more efficient protocol for this model was given by Cramer et al. [11] .
When additionally assuming oblivious transfer [36] besides broadcast, non-robust multi-party computation is achievable even in presence of any number of corrupted players [29] , [3] , [30] . 7 Furthermore, when only demanding robustness in the case that no players are corrupted, h = n, then the same results as in [2] , [37] , [29] , [3] , and [30] can also be achieved without broadcast channels [21] - [23] .
Implications. The results derived in this paper now imply that, instead of Model M n , Model M 3 is sufficient in order to achieve the result in [2] and [37] . That is, broadcast among three players is sufficient for MPC unconditionally secure for n/ h < 2. Furthermore, assuming oblivious transfer in Model M b (instead of Model M n as in [29] , [3] , and [30] ) still allows for unconditionally secure MPC for 2n/ h < b + 1.
Conclusion
It 
